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The social media has emerged as an appealing new channel for firms to promote prod- 
ucts/services. A fundamental but largely unanswered question is how would the firm use 
social media to promote products. We address the question by focusing on the movie in- 
dustry and developing a dynamic game-theoretic model. We assume that: 1) firm intends 
to build its market reputation; 2) consumers always prefer to watch a high-quality movie. 
Our model suggests that, it can be optimal for a rational firm to underrate the movie. More 
specifically, we find that the movie distribution firm would have incentives to overrate 
the movie even if they observe that the movie quality is low. Furthermore, we show that 
as long as there is a properly designed uncertainty resolution mechanism, the adoption of 
social media could alleviate the “Lemon” problem in the movie market, which in turn, 
improves market efficiency. 
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Do Firms Prefer Likers or Doubters?
1 Introduction
Social media has become increasingly popular as an instrument for the promotion of products/services
in many industries (Duan et al, 2008; Miller et al, 2013). Abundant evidence shows that promotions of
products using social media are effective in driving product sales (Miller, 2009; Luo et al, 2013; Chen
et al., 2015). For instance, Dell achieves three million revenue with Twitter-related sales (Miller, 2009).
For experienced goods such as movies, adopting social media is popular among firms in promoting their
products. Consumers may seek signals of quality in advance of watching and social media platforms
provide the best way for the audience to gather information. Bird box, a movie produced by Netflix, has
caught attention by massive social media fans because they feel like nobody in their life talks about this
movie but everyone on the Internet discusses it (Jordan, 2018). The popularity of adopting social media
raises consumers’ concern about the quality of information delivered through the promotion. Whether
the true quality of movie is reflected to market is also valued in addition to the movie quality per se.
Therefore, the firm concerns the accuracy of promotion as well as creating awareness on social media.
Companies use many ways to influence social media promotions such as giving away free products
(Zhu and Furr, 2016) and hiring experts or opinion leaders (Holbrook, 1999; Plucker et al. 2009) to write
reviews. Those mechanisms will lead to a situation that both “Likers” and “Doubters” will appear on
social media, which brings both positive reviews and negative reviews at the same time. Prior research
presents mixed results about having negative reviews about your products. Berger (2010) shows that
negative reviews showing on social media can boost the sales. While Basuroy et al (2003) point out that
negative reviews hurt performance more than positive reviews help performance. The actual effect of
having doubters remains unanswered. This phenomenon is intensified in social media promotion. In
this paper, we aim to study the following research question: How would the firm use social media to
promote products? Specifically, how the movie distribution firms would use social media to promote
the movies? What is the rationale for firms to underrate the movie quality? Can information technology
improve market efficiency?
To answer these questions, this paper develops a model to study the movie distribution firm’s strategy
of using social media to promote the movie. Our model suggests that under certain conditions, it is
optimal for a rational firm to underrate the movie through social media. More specifically, we find that
the movie distribution firm would have incentives to overrate the movie even if they observe that the
movie quality is low. Furthermore, we show that as long as there is a properly designed uncertainty
resolution mechanism, the adoption of social media could alleviate the ”Lemon” problem in the movie
market, which in turn, improve market efficiency.
Our model starts with two assumptions. First, the firm intends to build its market reputation. Second,
consumers always prefer to watch a high-quality movie. The model incorporates two uncertainties:
whether the firm observes the true quality of the movie, whether the firm is truthfully or strategically
promoting. At the beginning, the distribution firm receives a movie to promote, and the true quality of
the movie is not known. After the spot release, the firm briefly observes early feedback from the market,
e.g., organic reviews from consumers. This is an imperfect signal that indicates the quality of the movie.
After observing this signal, the firm chooses the action, that is, to overrate through “Likers” or underrate
through “Doubters” or do both on social media to promote the movie. Consumers update their beliefs
about the type of the firm and the quality of the movie after observing the firm’s action and then decide
whether to watch the movie. We impose a uncertainty resolution mechanism in revealing the true movie
quality. If the firm is revealed to be truthful promoting, it will successfully build the market reputation.
Our first result states that for any type of distribution firm, there exist equilibria under which the firm
would truthful promote the movie quality based on the observed signal at an early stage. This occurs
when the probability of uncertainty resolution on the movie quality is higher than some cutoff value.
The underlying logic is as follows. With greater probability the market will identify whether the firm is
exaggerating the quality of the movie, there is a greater chance the firm will lose reputation in the long
run. High uncertainty resolution probability will motivate the firm to be truthfully promoting in order to
build a market reputation.
Conversely, if the probability of uncertainty resolution is low, the firm might have an incentive to
exaggerate the quality of the movie to attract more consumers. A second factor that comes into play is
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the consumers’ requirement about the quality of the movie in order to decide to watch. If the requirement
is generally high among consumers, then the firm will exaggerate movie quality via the social media.
There are two reasons for this. If the firm overrates and convinces consumers that the movie quality is
high, then it would earn the current market return from distributing a high-quality movie. In addition,
given the probability of uncertainty resolution is low, it is likely that the market will not identify the
firm’s action. Therefore, the firm will overrate the movie when it observes low movie quality due to the
tradeoff between attracting more consumers and loss of reputation.
However, if the consumers’ requirement is low, we have a counter-intuitive result that the firm does
not always have the incentive to exaggerate the movie quality given the probability of uncertainty reso-
lution is small. In this case, consumers may still watch the movie even if firm truthfully promote a low
movie quality. There is little benefit for the firm to exaggerate the movie quality. Therefore the firm will
still choose to promote the movie truthfully.
2 Model
Let us consider a movie market with one distribution firm, a continuum of consumer. The quality of a
movie is described by a binary state variable, 𝑠 ∈ {𝐻,𝐿}, which is random and distributes according to
Prob{𝑠 = 𝐻} = 𝜋 > 1/2, and with probability of 1 − 𝜋, it is low-quality. The movie distribution firm
can be one of the two types: 𝜃 ∈ {𝜃1, 𝜃2}. With probability 𝑟 ∈ (0, 1), the firm is “high-quality/honest”
which is denoted by 𝜃1, and with probability 1 − 𝑟, it is normal type/low-quality/strategic type. The
movie distribution firm observes an informative but imperfect signal, e.g., watch the preview version of
a movie:
Prob{𝜔 = ?̂?|𝐻} = Prob{𝜔 = ?̂?|𝐿} = 𝑞 ∈ (𝜋, 1).
Assuming 𝑞 > 𝜋 will ensure Prob{𝑥 = 𝐻|𝜔 = ?̂?} > Prob{𝑥 = 𝐿|𝜔 = ?̂?}. Here, to avoid the
confusion on the notations, we use ?̂? to indicate that the observed signal is𝐻 , and use ?̂? to indicate that
the observed signal is 𝐿. We explain 𝑞 as a measure of distribution firm’s expertise. In other words, a
distribution firm with more industry experience would be more likely to observe the true state, i.e., the
true quality of the movie.
After observing the signal, the firm strategically choose the social media advertisement 𝑥 ∈ {𝐻,𝐿}.
Here, 𝑥 represents the actions which can be used to infer the quality of a movie. For instance, hiring
“Doubter” (𝐿) or “Liker” (𝐻). Therefore, if 𝑥 = 𝐻 , it indicates that the movie is high-quality; if 𝑥 = 𝐿,
it indicates that the movie is low-quality. From now on, we denote the firm’s strategy by 𝜎(𝑥 = 𝜔|𝜃2) =
Prob(𝑥|𝜔, 𝜃2). This reads as: after observing signal 𝜔,the firm would choose 𝑥 = 𝜔 with probability
𝜎𝜔(𝑥|𝜃2). To reduce the issues caused by multiple equilibria and tedious technical details, we assume
that a high-quality firm always reports observed signal honestly, i.e., 𝜎(𝑥 = 𝜔|𝜃1) = 1. Thus, only the
low-quality firm can strategically advertise the observed signal by freely choosing either 𝐻 or 𝐿. For
simplicity, we denote the low-quality firm’s strategy conditional on its signal by𝜎(𝑥|𝜔) = Prob(𝑥|𝜔, 𝜃2),
and restrict our attention to the case under which 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?) ≥ 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?). Cases where this assumption does
not hold are equivalent to a relabeling of the reporting. The firm that choose both “Doubter” and “Liker”
correspond to the cases of 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?) ∈ (0, 1) and 𝜎(𝐿|?̂?) ∈ (0, 1).
What is essential for our modeling is the information conveyed in the promotion but not the form
of the promotion it takes. In this sense, our model could include many other advertisement strategy,
provided that these different strategies would convey different impressions about the true quality of the
movie.
After watching the movie, we assume that with probability 𝜌 ∈ (0, 1), the uncertainty of the quality
can be resolved before next purchase. The rationale for introducing this uncertainty resolution mech-
anism is to capture the consumer’s personal expertise on the movie quality or the complication of the
movie topic. When 𝜌 → 1, it corresponds to a movie which is easy to be identified as good or bad. Then
𝜌 → 0, corresponds to the opposite case.
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2.1 Preference
For consumers, their preferences are defined as below. If 𝔼[(𝑥 − 𝔼(𝑥|𝜋))2|𝜇(𝑎)] ≥ 0, consumer will
choose to watch: 𝑑 = 1, i.e.,
𝜇(𝑎)[𝐵 − 𝜋𝐵]2 + (1 − 𝜇(𝑎))[0 − 𝜋𝐵]2 ≥ 0
with 𝐵 > 0, which is equivalent to 𝜇(𝑎)(1 − 𝜋)2 + (1 − 𝜇(𝑎))𝜋2 ≥ 0, i.e.,
𝜇(𝜋2 − 2𝜋 + 1) + (1 − 𝜇)𝜋2 ≥ 0 ⇔ 𝜇(𝜋2 − 2𝜋 + 1 − 𝜋2) ≥ −𝜋2
i.e.,





1 − 2𝜋 if 𝜋 < 1/2
≤ −𝜋
2
1 − 2𝜋 if 𝜋 > 1/2
.
Therefore, given 𝜋 > 1/2, then 𝑑 = 1 if 𝜇 > 𝜇∗ ≡ 𝜋2𝜋 − 1 . Given 𝜋 ≤ 1/2, then 𝑑 = 1 for any 𝜇.
For the distribution firm, the payoff is
𝑈𝐹 = 1purchase1𝑠𝑈




0 No pruchase and 1𝑠 = {
1 If 𝑥 = 𝑠
0 If 𝑥 ≠ 𝑠
The firm’s outside options are normalized to zero. Here, we assume that truthful reporting the observed
signal always gives the firm the same positive expected payoff no matter which state is realized. This
assumption also catch the point under which the market would always reward an honest firm.
2.2 Timing
Overall, the timeline of the game is as follows:
1. nature determines the type of the firm and the quality of the movie;
2. firm observes the signal 𝑠 according to the type and chooses 𝑥;
3. with probability 𝜌 ∈ (0, 1) the consumer would observe the true state 𝑠 (identify the quality of the
movie), and update beliefs on the type of the firm and choose whether to watch movies provided
by the firm in the future;
4. the payoffs are realized.
For further analysis, we now introduce some notations. First, we define the states after which the
consumer would make purchase decision asA = {𝐻,𝐿, ∅}. Then we use 𝐴𝑖 to denote the 𝑖th element
in setA which indicates the state of uncertainty resolution. Second, we denote 𝜇(𝜃1|𝑥, 𝐴𝑖) as the
consumer’s posterior on the firm’s type being a high-quality type after observing 𝑥. For ease of
reference, we summarize the main notations used in our model in Table 1.
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Notation Description
𝑠 Random variable describing the state of the world, i.e., quality of movie
𝜔 The signal observed by a firm
𝐻 The value of the movie quality when it is realized to be high
?̂? Observed signal is 𝐻
𝐿 The value of the movie quality when it is realized to be low
?̂? Observed signal is 𝐿
𝜋 The probability that the quality of a movie is realized to be high𝐻
𝜃 The type of a distribution firm
𝜃1 A high-quality firm
𝜃2 A low-quality firm
𝑞 The probability of firm getting a signal truthfully indicating the movie quality
𝑟 The probability that a firm is a high-quality
𝑥 The action chosen by the firm
𝜎(𝑥|𝜔) The normal type firm’s strategy conditional on its observed signal
𝜌 The probability that the uncertainty of the quality of movie can be resolved. Here
𝜌 is never going to reach 1.
𝑈𝐹 The utility of firm
∅ It indicates that the state of the uncertainty is not resolved
𝐴 It indicates the state of uncertainty resolution
𝜇(𝜃1|𝑥, 𝐴𝑖) Consumer’s posterior on the firm being a high-quality type after observing a
report 𝑥




We now present our main results. In the following results, given different parameter space,
1. for any type distribution firm, there exists an equilibrium under which it would choose to truthfully
report the observed signal, i.e., no mix;
2. firm of low quality would always buy 𝑥 = 𝐻 if 𝜔 = 𝐻 , and buy both 𝐻 and 𝐿, if 𝜔 = 𝐿; and
high-quality firm would always truthfully report the observed signal.
Formally, we have:
Proposition. Given 𝜇(𝜃1|𝐿, ∅) < 𝜇∗ < 𝜇(𝜃1|𝐻, ∅):
1. if 𝜌 > 𝜌∗, there is an equilibrium under which
(a) 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?) = 1 and 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?) = 0;
2. if 𝜌 < 𝜌∗, there is an equilibrium under which
(a) when 𝜇(𝜃1|𝐿, ∅) < 𝜇∗ < 𝑟
i. 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?) = 1 and 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?) ∈ (0, 1];
(b) when 𝑟 < 𝜇∗ < 𝜇(𝜃1|𝐻1, ∅)
i. 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?) = 1 and 𝜎(𝐻|?̂?) ∈ (0, 1];
where 𝜇∗ is the cut-off value of consumer’s purchase decision, 𝜌∗ = 2𝜓(𝐻|?̂?) − 1 + 𝑞
2𝑞(1 − 𝜓(𝐻|?̂?))
with 𝜓(𝐻|𝑠) as
firm’s posterior beliefs that the true state of the world is𝐻 given the observed signal is 𝑠 ∈ {?̂?, ?̂?}.
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𝜌 > 𝜌∗ 𝜌 < 𝜌∗
Honest promote 𝜇
∗ < 𝜇(𝜃1|𝐿, ∅) 𝜇(𝜃1|𝐿, ∅) < 𝜇∗ < 𝜇(𝜃1|𝐻, ∅) 𝜇∗ > 𝜇(𝜃1|𝐻, ∅)
Honest promote Low quality firm would choose both
“Doubter” and “Liker” when observing 𝐿
Honest promote
Table 2: Summary of results
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